

ANE/outlines

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(Transcribed Tape 1)

As I learned the nature of the U.S. nuclear war planning, in the Pacific in particular, in 1959 and 1960, I learned that it had some very peculiar properties, as military plans. There was essentially one single plan for conduct of large-scale nuclear war, no matter how it arose—what the purposes were, what the occasions were. It was a plan for the destruction of a fixed, pre-selected target list, by all the available vehicles, in which no reserves were held. In strategy, in general, there is always the question of being able to commit reserves at some point, when you could see how the battle was going and where they were needed, on the basis of events—where they can do the most good. When you've committed your reserves, strategy is over. There's nothing left to decide. This plan didn't allow for any reserves, essentially. All available forces were to be committed, and as new forces became available because they'd been in maintenance or hadn't been on alert, they were not to be held back as reserves at all but to be committed immediately as soon as they became available, again against this preselected target list.

Another feature was that under all circumstances, this target list intermingled Chinese and Soviet targets. There was no provision whatever for fighting the Soviet Union separately from fighting China, even though in 1960 and '61, it was becoming very evident that for some time there had been a split between the Chinese and the Soviets that arose in particular out of the Russian refusal in 1958 to turn over nuclear weapons to the Chinese, and they withdrew their technicians, because of the nuclear crisis, the Quemoy crisis, in 1958. There came to be a very great split between then, but nevertheless our targeting reflected a Sino-Soviet bloc, and no matter how the war started, the provision was essentially to hit every major target in China as well as Russia.

Since the war might likely start over some event in Europe, like some fighting between East and West Germany, or a Russian invasion of Yugoslavia, or conceivably a Russian invasion of Iran, it wasn't obvious under the circumstances why you were annihilating the Chinese, but that's the way the plans were. As a matter of fact, on the top secret maps, usually covered by a curtain if there was an uncleared person in the room, that showed the target list, in many cases there was no boundary by Russia and China indicated on the map. You couldn't tell, just by looking. In some cases, just for interest, they had pinned in with yarn a rough boundary between Russia and China, but it wasn't actually on the map.

Moreover, on an alert force with a line of planes lined up on an alert force, one plane might be targeted for the Russian territory, and the one next to it targeted to China, scrambled up. You couldn't easily unscramble them just by taking one flight of planes off in a given squadron. They had different targets. Also, in the IBM cards that had target coordinates, didn't indicate what country the coordinates were in. So it couldn't have been more clearly arranged that under all circumstances you hit both Russia and China.

The other thing was that the single plan involved hitting all the known military targets but also every city. In fact, the emphasis in the planning was on the major population centers—those had to be destroyed. One reason the plan worked that way was that the most of the Pacific Command forces could only reach China, and even the ones that could reach Russian territory, there were very few targets in that part of Eastern Russian territory, namely Vladivostok. Once you did

Vladivostok, there weren't a lot of targets to hit. So if there was to be a major war, a general war, the Pacific command would either go against China, or it would sit out most of the war, because they couldn't hit Russia and there wasn't much to hit anyway.

That was anathema, an unthinkable nightmare. So there was a very strong incentive on their part to assume—and they did assume—that under any circumstances under which you were fighting Russia, you would also want to annihilate their communist partners, the Chinese, even though from a deterrent point of view one could argue that the Russians would be more deterred by the thought that the Chinese would survive a war, than that they would also be destroyed.

The reason why all the attention was given to this one single target list was that it was extremely complicated to do that planning, and they simply didn't have the time or the computer capability to produce more than one option. They had what they called different "options," but what those really were, they just amounted to how much running time there was before the war started, and therefore, how many planes you could get on line. But they were still going for the same essential target system, and the others would be sent as they became available—the more time you had the more you could send.

Why this one single target list? Because they were working night and day very hard on preparing this plan, and they didn't have the ability to do any other. But why was it quite that complicated? Here was a reason that nobody outside the system knew that bore very much on the possibility that there would be no alternatives, no choice, no control on the attack. By the way, they were very apprehensive about the possibility that the President might try to exert some control—he would just screw things up. It was this: later, in terms of missiles, it was called interference. They called it fratricide. This was almost entirely an airplane campaign. 20 years later when it was all missiles, the question arose that when we were sending these thousands of warheads, the first warhead to go down would create a huge stem of fragments in the air—boulders, pebbles, radioactive material. The other missiles would be coming, and they would be not only deflected by this extreme turbulence, but also pretty much destroyed. They might not explode at all, because of the effects of hitting all these rocks on the warheads. It's called fratricide, as a real problem, and how to deal with that. It meant that if the first missile missed the target, the others would be coming in to assure that you got it, but the others would be exploded in the air, or bent out of shape so much that they wouldn't get down. Well, not a terribly serious problem, if you've got thousands of warheads on missiles.

But what they were worrying about with the planes was this: you've got something like a thousand targets out of a target system of maybe forty thousand. It went up to vast numbers—twenty thousand, forty thousand. Many of those targets were co-located, essentially the same—they'd be covered by the same explosion. But you had thousands of planes going against them—2000 B-52's and B-47's, but above all you had a couple thousand tactical bombers from carriers and bases. Problem: the basic idea was that you'd bomb as you go. You'd bomb the outermost target first and you'd work your way in, especially getting the air defenses in the outer periphery, so the later bombers would have a corridor they could go through without air defenses.

But the nuclear explosions would do two things: they would blow planes out of the air at a great rate—kill all the planes in a vast area of blastwave, clean the area of planes. And the other thing is that at a much greater distance they would totally blind pilots. They flash from the explosions, before the blastwave hit them, the flash would literally blind them. So one thing they tried to do on that was to develop goggles that would turn opaque faster than the flash would hit the retina. They worked very hard—I don't know how well they succeeded on that. Another one was to develop shutters in the plane that again would be triggered by the flash, in the split second—split-split-split second between the flash hitting the plane and the flash hitting the eyes, this shutter would come down. That was a problem I'm not sure if they ever solved. Another one was simply to have shutters all the time, which you could do, just have no visibility and fly by instruments all the time. You could do that, by pilots seem to like to have some degree of visibility.

But that was just a symbolic problem. The larger issue was that the blast from these things would be blowing all the planes to pieces. So, in order to avoid that, they were doing extremely intricate—this was 1960, so these were early IBMs, so it's 20 years before the personal computer. They were dealing with very primitive computers. When I first went to Rand they were still using vacuum tube computers, which were always blowing out—they'd. They were this huge enormous thing which had enormous heating problems. They were very unreliable, and were always breaking down. So most of these calculations were not done with computers in the Pacific—I'm not even sure if they had computers. They had to do enormous calculations to devise routes into the target which would be timed so that you'd have to mark where the blasts were going to occur and exactly when they were going to occur so that you wouldn't be passing that at a distance and at a time that you'd be blown out of the air.

Well, you're talking about thousands of explosions now. You're talking about weaving your way through this field of explosions, timing it just perfectly so you'd go in between—here's an explosion on this side, here's an explosion on that side. Of course, the key to that was knowing exactly when each explosion was going to go off, so everything had to be timed: This explosion will go off at time-over-target—TOT—was timed from the Go order. You know, a hundred and seventeen minutes and thirty seconds after Execute order, this explosion will go off over here, and two minutes later this explosion will be going off over there. The plane then has to be timed to be going through those two paths at just a time when it won't be hit by the shockwave.

The trouble was—and I was looking at the exercises they'd done on this at the time—that you couldn't predict really—you could say when the explosion was supposed to occur, based on the distance, the speed of the plane, getting up to altitude, etc., but in fact there was no way that you could hit that time with that explosion within minutes, or hours in many cases. Seconds mattered here, if you're trying to miss these explosions. Half a minute made a big difference.

So the prediction was almost meaningless, for two very big reasons. One was that even though they were very disciplined to get off the ground very fast when they got the execute order. That part they really practiced a lot, and they could do this astounding business of getting off the ground in ten minutes. Of course, that would vary too in reality, but pretty much they really worked on that, so they could do that part. However, that's 10 minutes from getting the order. The first point was, the difference in times between getting the orders for different bases was

hours. It wasn't supposed to be—it was supposed to be in seconds. But in actual fact, in command post exercises, you looked down, the order goes out, and when did they actually receive it and react on it? There were always problems in atmospheric disturbances, or in messages getting mis-sent, or held up in some relay point—and most of these things had to go through relay points—and the range was enormous. Minutes made a difference here, and the range was like four hours. Sometimes some bases wouldn't get the order, period, so your orders to all over the place, supposedly all getting there at the same time, were actually reaching at different times. So the idea of hitting all those target times was impossible. It would never even remotely happen.

Furthermore, the ability to make those times depended very heavily on wind, as you see every time you fly across the country. But, the planes hitting a particular target were usually coming from different bases—in fact, that was deliberate, for reliability. The planes would often be coming at the target from either 180 degrees or more likely a 90 degree angle, so whatever the wind was, it was affecting the two sets of planes totally differently—slowing one down and speeding the other one up. How do you deal with the fact that you don't know where the wind is coming from, if you're trying to assign all these target times? Well, their way of dealing with it was not to allow for wind at all. Just assume there was no wind. It's like assuming things are falling in a perfect vacuum.

The point was, this elaborate scheduling had no meaning at all. It wasn't going to save any lives. There was no possibility it could save any lives of the pilots. But because they focused so much—in the process, by the way, of planning to kill several hundred million people—that in the process of doing that, they were so focused on the need to do what they could to save the lives of these pilots from what they called mutual interference, rather than sending them into this field, that they felt they had to do what they could, make every calculation they could, as if it could be calculated.

Well, on the one hand, this was a total delusion, but it had two other implications. The priorities involved, of saving the lives of some fraction of several thousand pilots, in a world which is about to be blown up—you're entire priority is on that rather than worrying about whether you're killing 20, forty or a 100 million people too many that you didn't have to kill—like, China, when it really wasn't necessary to hit China. That was one implication on the values here.

The other thing was though the extreme complexity of this entire illusory effort was such that they couldn't possibly think of doing anything but implementing that one plan. They couldn't have an alternate plan. They didn't have time. It took them all year or more to produce a yearly plan.

The analogy, by the way, was very much in my mind on what I had read, some books I'd read at Harvard, on the origins of the first world war, where the planning for mobilization—the idea there was to get men to the front from reserves. They didn't have big standing armies. The reserves had to be called up, and when they were called up from their homes, they had to be transported by train, and joined up together by divisions, and divisions had to be brought up from the front—it was a matter of train schedules. And that was so complex that again they had essentially one plan, and they could not countenance the idea of changing any of it, because if

you tried to change it, you would totally screw the whole thing up, and you'd be helpless, and if the other guy was able to attack you during this period, you'd be lying there like a turtle on its back.

The effect of that was, then, two-fold on the first world war, which I felt was going to be reproduced in World War Three, and which would have been. Because of this they couldn't take the moves that would have limited the war. Specifically, the Russians had a plan only for mobilizing against Austria and Germany—the Russians had this vast plan, millions of men—and the Germans had already said, “If you mobilize against us, we attack. Three words: mobilization means war. We're telling you before hand. We can't wait for you to finish your mobilization. If you start mobilization against us, we mobilize faster and we attack.” They made that explicit, and all their planning was based on that. So the tsar was told, we've got to mobilize to protect Austria in its fight with the serbs. And the czar says, doesn't that mean mobilizing against the whole front, against germany. And they say, “Yes, that's our plan,” and the Czar says, but if we do that, Kaiser Willhelm will go to war. We'll be at war with Germany. So the Czar tries to order that they mobilize only against Austria. This drives the Russian general staff crazy, because they can see now going down to the total collapse of the Russian empire, because you can't do that. If you tried to do that, you'd be totally vulnerable to the Germans, if they wanted to attack, you'd be so screwed up. And moreover, you couldn't even make the plans. You just couldn't do it. So they do everything they can—they practically twist the Czar's neck, to get out of him an order to do the whole mobilization, which he does with extreme anxiety and reluctance, and hence then thirty million men died. Because the plan was so rigid, because it was one plan, couldn't be changed.

And one other aspect. The nature of the plans was such that the one who did it first won, and the other guy lost. That's what they thought. Actually, it didn't matter, because they slammed into each other. But their notion was, “You've got to get in first,” just as we thought “You've got to get in first with nuclear weapons.” So again, the minute the Russians started mobilizing, the Germans went into high gear to pre-empt—that was the word. So, I could see we were heading into a situation for almost the same reasons—single, rigid plan, and not looking at the consequences.

One objective that I had, especially going into '61, as the Sino-Soviet split became more and more obvious was, there should at least exist a plan for fighting the Russians without fighting the Chinese, which—from the point of view of the pacific, made them almost vomit. I raised that on the Seventh Fleet command ship with admiral Kivette. I asked, “What if you got orders to fight Russian but not China.” There was a long silence where he was struggling with nausea practically, and finally he says, “You have to assume that the people in Washington have a modicum of rationality and would not dream of fighting the Soviet Union without also fighting China. The horror of that idea was extreme. And yet I, on the other hand, little me, did have in my mind that it should be possible for the President to fight Russia in some fashion without also fighting China, which the plans didn't allow them to do.

Each plan starts with the statement “This plan is based on the plans of the next higher level authority” In other words, the Seventh Fleet plan would say “This plan is based on plan xxx of the Pacific Command, the Pacific command would say, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the plan

would in turn be sent down to the next lowest level of authority to create a plan based on that one. Looking at the emergency action messages sent out, I was able to show in a briefing that I gave to RAND, which I wrote up in a top-secret paper called the Pac-Com response to an emergency message. And I could show that if the president actually gave the order to go to war against military targets in Russian—if he should amazingly, crazily decide to do that—the way the structure . The emergency action message would go out from the Pentagon, to the pacific command, they would send a message down to the next level, down to the next level—if you looked at those messages, which no one had done—how they would respond, you could demonstrate very clearly the effect of ordering an attack on military targets in Russia would be that the pacific command would destroy every city in China.

Unfortunately, that paper is one that I copied, along with a lot of other papers, when I copied the Pentagon Papers, but it was lost. In theory, it could be gotten. In other words, I have a list, with the numbers and the names of these papers. In theory-- someone could make an effort, and maybe in 8 or 10 years they would actually get that, or maybe more, or maybe less, or maybe never. But get them out of the Pentagon. It's just possible. But they were lost. And this was along with the Nato nuclear war plans, the PACCOM nuclear war plans—my summary of all those war plans.

I started copying. Actually, I started with the stuff from around the Tonkin Gulf period, just as highest priority to put out—the most dramatic, from 1964 or 1965. But within days I had decided to begin copying everything in my safe, including all the nuclear stuff, and when, by the time I saw Randy Kehler in November, for the second time, after seeing him in August in Haverford, in San Francisco, I told him what I was doing. He was going to prison within a month. So I wanted to get his advice. And he said, don't bother with the Vietnam history. It's all history, and we know enough about Vietnam. People know about Vietnam. Put out the nuclear.

And I said, well, that's very plausible, you may well be right that the Vietnam won't have much effect or any effect. But still, Vietnam is where the bombs are falling now, and it seems to me I've got to do everything I can to avert this immediate escalation, that's coming soon.

What I didn't know then was that that escalation had been planned for November 3rd—this was now November 15th—they'd been planning already, and it included nuclear weapons, But now it had been postponed because of the Moritorium, which I didn't realize. So I said, OK, we've got to try to head off—I didn't realize it was impossible to head off Vietnam at that point. But I said. So I'm going to do the Vietnam first. So my basic labor, from a personal point of view, of what I was up to was was always in my mind, given the limits of what I had—I was focused on trying to end the war—but in terms of documents, I really saw that I am now going to put out the nuclear documents that I could have done in 1959 or 60 or 61—whether I should have or not at that point. So anyway, I always thought, the major thing I'm going to do is tell the truth about the nuclear war. Well it took longer to get the stuff out than I expected—I expected it to be out within weeks at that point. Then in the Spring of '70 I thought it would be out within months because of Cambodia. So anyway, that took longer than I thought. The Pentagon Papers come out, then we're in trial, we go through all that.

So then I figure, OK, I'm going to be putting out the nuclear papers as soon as this is over, and I'll be up for bigger trials, which I will almost surely lose—I won't get away with putting out nuclear stuff, and that will be very serious. But my best chance of lowering my prison sentence from that is to win this trial if we can, on almost any grounds—whereas, if I go into the nuclear trial having lost on just this pitiful history stuff, it's very unpromising for the nuclear trial, and it makes it look all the more serious. So better to establish the principle that you can put out some secret documents.

MICHAEL: How did you plan to get the nuclear stuff out if you were in prison for the Pentagon Papers?

No problem. The plan just was, they won't get the papers away from me, and I'll just get the word out. That's not too hard, through a lawyer or a visitor—just get 'em out. I wouldn't do it—somebody else would, the same way as with the Pentagon Papers.

MICHAEL: Then Harry lost them.

And it wasn't clear for a long time that they were irrecoverable. It wasn't clear to me. Harry says now—he didn't tell me this at the time, because he didn't want to discourage me. He worked very very hard at it at the time, they did a lot of things, but he just knew it was irrecoverable.

But that wasn't clear to me, I didn't really face it. I thought, well, we'll make a bigger effort. So I somehow kept it in my mind until the war ended, then I turned to that, and I said, OK, now we'll do that, a little before the war ended, I said, OK, now we'll get ready for the nuclear, and then I had to face up.

You know, there's sort of a drama. It's always a question whether it's worth telling this story or not—it's part of the story. It's what I was really doing.

MICHAEL: You might as well write it and see how it fits in.

DANIEL: Here's how it affected things. . .

MICHAEL: We shouldn't go into too much detail.

DANIEL: OK, but one thing. Kissinger and Nixon clearly assumed—they knew what was in my safe. They got a report of that right away. It's clear to me that they assumed from very early on that I had copied everything in my safe. They knew I had NSC documents. They didn't know what they were, right away, but they knew almost right away that I had documents that I had not yet release. They could see from that that that included a lot of nuclear stuff.

They were afraid that if they moved too fast—for instance, before the election—I would release stuff that I had not otherwise planned to release that early—they would press me into releasing faster which they didn't want released.

One of those things was a very Strangelovian type of analysis by Henry Kissinger of the whole balance—the usual thing from RAND of so many hundreds of millions of people killed, familiar to the people inside, but absolutely blood curdling to someone who wasn't used to that. Just a speculation, but I've often suspected that if Kissinger was really worried about something, it was about that.

That one, since it's a NSSM. It's NSSM 3—I wrote NSSM 1—this is NSSM 3, and the request for strategic calculation has come out, but they never released it. Now that's 1969, that's thirty five years ago. Now one could make a case that it might be worth getting that out. That would be wonderful to get out while Kissinger is alive. So there's a question of if we tell that story.

MICHAEL: Well, just write it. I'm a good editor. I'll see if it fits, or if it's necessary.

DANIEL: See, it has an effect on what I was doing.

MICHAEL: Well you should write it as it happened.

DANIEL: You think so?

MICHAEL: Yeah, and if we have to change things around a little in terms of narrative we can. We're not going to mislead, but we may leave that out.

DANIEL: I gave a briefing to McGeorge Bundy in late January, or early February of 1961, he was just in office—it was during his first month in office—and basically I told him about 4 or 5 individual points. I told him that there were nuclear weapons in Iwakuni, that had been denied to the SecDef. 20 years later, in the early eighties, that got confirmed. I said it again to a reporter, and he checked it with Ritzhouer and Nitze, and they confirmed it, and that lead to a big uproar in Japan. The ship had stayed there for years.

Second, the question of the delegation. Of course, that goes into the campaign of 1964, the big lies of 1964.

The necessity of the President to see those war plans, and to change them. There, I wrote—I was given the job of writing the new guidance, and in every respect I changed the guidance, from what it had been before. I wrote about 20 pages of guidance, in a plan that was usually 2 to 4 pages of very general guidance, which I'd come to. I gave very detailed guidance for things that had to change, some of which is still classified. We can put that out. The paper as a whole has never been declassified, although a lot of it has been declassified, but parts are still classified, and in particular, the parts that suggest the problem of delegation are classified still, so we can put that out, as history—spectacular history, and explain it.

Do remember the part in Dr. Strangelove when the planes are on their way, and they try to call them back, and the President is informed that there is no way to authenticate an order to bring them back—that there was no stop code, or come-back code, that they could recognize as authentic. They could get on the phone and just say “come back,” but they would have no way of recognizing who was saying that. It could be the Russians, so they were saying, unless you get

an authenticated order, don't do it, it could be the Russians, and they didn't have an authenticated code for that. That's in the movie. So they can't call them back.

That was exactly the way it was. I'll take two minutes to tell you about the way the go codes were authenticated. . .

MICHAEL: About the letters?

DANIEL: Oh, you know about that?

MICHAEL: Yeah, you told me.

DANIEL: So, any person with one of those letters could have given a go order to other people in a squadron, or in a different squadron, simply by ripping open the envelope and reading what the code was, which he wasn't supposed to do unless he got a certain signal, but nothing was stopping him from ripping open those letters. But what was not inside those letters was a stop code, and he couldn't send one.

There's an aspect of this that again goes through all the planning of the '50's and '60's. Let's put it this way. Some of what appears to be fairly irrational, sort of bureaucratic irrationality, really reflected a very intense and widespread feeling among the military of distrust for the civilian leadership, including for the president—very much including the president—and that had to do with first that the president would interfere with war planning in ways that would destroy its effectiveness, that he would act out of either excessive caution or cowardice, or a simple lack of understanding of how the military worked—that you couldn't just tinker piecemeal with these elaborate plans that he would think he could control much more delicately and precisely as possible, and it wouldn't just be an inconvenience and an irritation, but he would totally screw things up, and lose the war.

They were very concerned to keep the president—once the war had started—to make it clear there was just no way of effecting how things were going to happen. And that meant to a large degree they had to deny themselves the ability to control. They had to be able to tell the president, "It's impossible. You can't do that." They had to make it impossible.

One reason things were in such a hair-trigger was they had a fear that in the nuclear world above all—and this was like what people felt in the First World War, but now to an extreme degree—you had to move very fast. You had to hit everything as simultaneous as possible, with as much assurance as possible, and that meant assigning a lot of forces to the same target.

With this emphasis then on speed, and moving first, they wanted to be sure you got the war going, and once you got it going, that you couldn't stop it.

MICHAEL: They told the Russians about all this, didn't they?

DANIEL: No, they didn't.

MICHAEL: It's like that line at the end of *Strangelove*—"You were supposed to tell us you had a doomsday machine."

DANIEL: No—not all this.

MICHAEL: Why wouldn't they want to make it clear to the Russians how automatic all of this was.

DANIEL: OK, here's another point. Rand, like most of the country, despite our Top Secret clearances, our level of understanding judged the procedures and the weapons in terms of the objective of deterring a Soviet surprise attack. Looking back on it, a characteristic that runs through this whole period is that, on the one hand, the military were always constantly exaggerating what the Russians had, as a basis for building up their own forces, and they would have done that, even if the Russians had had quite a bit—they would have doubled it, or exaggerated it.

But looking back, what was not apparent at RAND—they knew, what we did not know, that the Russians were really very weak, that their forces were very hollow, very inefficient, that they were not a sizeable threat. It's not clear to me now whether the joint chiefs really knew how weak the Iraqi forces were in the Gulf war, and now. I think they did know it now because of the 10 years of sanctions. In the Gulf War it turned out to be a totally hollow force, as the Russians turned out to be in Afghanistan. But they did not do that about the Russians, that they were facing a very weak enemy. So what we took to be a very inefficient, or strange, or incompetent, or reckless approach to deterrence, was in fact—we were looking at a system that really wasn't oriented towards deterrence at all. They knew that wasn't important. It was oriented towards first strike.

So we kept saying, God, you're allowing these vulnerabilities to a Russian force. They knew the Russian force didn't exist, wasn't going to exist, and you didn't have to worry about vulnerability—it was a false problem. Here Wohlstedder wrote this very "influential" article that had very great impact on somebody else—I just read it today—the article that brought Richard Perle into the strategic business was Albert's famous article, the "Delicate Balance of Terror," and it was delicate because, despite the fact that we had a lot of weapons, the balance of terror, the deterrence was not reliable. On the contrary, it was very delicate or unstable, or fragile, because of the possibility that our weapons could be destroyed on the ground.

So Albert made this great distinction, which everything at RAND was oriented around, "What counts is not First-Strike capability, but second strike capability. In other words, what you have left after you've been hit. That is what your deterrence depends on."

Well all that is premised on the thought that the other guy has something to hit you with, which they didn't in fact have. So, with all our vulnerabilities, our deterrence against, say, Mexico, was really very stable, because they didn't have any ability to hit us, and the Russians didn't have it either. Essentially nobody outside the defense department—nobody at Rand. I don't think anybody at Rand. The public might have this or that opinion about what the Russians have, but what do they know? But what they were increasingly told was that the Russians. . .

Oh, then what happened was Sputnik, in 1957, and creates this enormous effect, like 9-11. All of the sudden, this contemptible Asiatic power has done something we can't do, and you can hear it on your radio. . . beep beep beep. It was going along and it emitted a beeping sound all the time, and you could see it. I don't think I ever saw it, but other people would watch it—you could see it without a telescope if you looked at the right place and the right time. You could actually see this flashing object in the sky—not really bright, but that had a fantastic impact.

That immediately meant they could hit us with an ICBM, which was true. If you could put a satellite up, you could get an ICBM over, and we couldn't do that yet—we couldn't get a satellite, because our rockets weren't good enough. So from 57-61, we had this great sense of vulnerability, on the assumption that there were building ICBMs fast, which Krushchev said they were—he said they were turning out missiles like sausages. Well, in one sense that was true. Medium-range missiles aimed at Germany they were turning out like sausages, and we underestimated there. They were ready to make Germany into one big hole to the center of the Earth, and they weren't turning out any ICBMs, so our vulnerabilities weren't there. Planes, supposedly they had more planes than we did. They did what they could to bluff us, at great cost. They actually had flyovers on national day in November, which we would observe with our attaches, and they had these bears—Russian heavy bombers—and the flight would go by, and circle around, and come by again, and gave the impression that there was this long stream of bombers—“My God, more than we have, how can this be?” They actually did that. Well, a costly deception, because that enlarged our production of bombers.

So Eisenhower wasn't doing what we thought was necessary to reduce the vulnerability of our force. We thought he was doing that—he knew there was no missile gap. The Army and Navy said there was no missile gap. As far as we could tell, influenced by the Air Force, which was putting out sheer propaganda, which we believed, Top Secret—we actually did believe it, as the Air Force did—that the Army and Navy was being virtually treasonous in their desire to cap the budget from the Air Force, and we thought of Eisenhower as so obsessed with not spending money, and so out of it [pause]

Reading about the arrogance and fanaticism of the Kabbal of neocons, under the influence of Albert Wohlstedder, in the Pentagon, ignoring—choosing to believe one kind of intelligence, contemptuous of any kind of intelligence that seemed to disprove because they thought it was biased and cautious and not realistic, and believing their own counsel and each other, essentially, it really did remind me of the way this Kabbal of Rand people and others in the Air Force, in our feeling, we were very contemptuous of the President, that he was ignoring the real security of the country. Two people who shared that belief, by the way, were Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, and Nelson Rockefeller, and there was a big Rockefeller report that was just plagiarized from Rand stuff.

But we believed this. The reason Nixon couldn't do much about that was that he was running for President under Eisenhower, he couldn't come out and say that he disagreed with Eisenhower, but he really did.

We had in other words this notion that somehow we've got to make them aware of this enormous threat. It's like making them aware of the need to invade Iraq. We didn't want to invade Russia at all, but we wanted to change the spending posture in a variety of ways, very very urgently, but it was a false problem. There were real problems in the world, and one of them was how to take advantage that Russia was not committed to an arms race, to keep it uncommitted to an arms race, to nail that down with arms agreements and test bands.

Anyway, it did occur to me that part of this story, from a memoirish point of view, I can be very confessing, if I want, in an attitude that was wrongheaded. It was conscientious and patriotic, but so is Perle, basically, but was working on wrong problems, illusory problems. Like a lot of people in the government really did believe we had to stop Saddam before he did get the weapons of mass destruction. [pause]

The world is on the brink of a wave of proliferation of nuclear weapons. It's been threatened and feared for some forty years, and I think there's every likelihood that, lead by the united states nuclear policies, and by the united states invasion of Iraq, that there is about to be a domino effect of imitation of the American example of threatening first use of nuclear weapons, as we did in the first Gulf war and in this war, protecting themselves against aggressive interventions of the kind we just launched on Iraq.

I think the lesson drawn on the Iraq war is that the United States cannot be contained or deterred from attacking third world countries that do not have nuclear weapons, and that Saddam would infact had been safer if he had the weapons that the United States was projecting for him on the future.

It doesn't look safe for these countries to pursue an overt policy of producing plutonium and enriched uranium, but their possibility of buying the weapons, essentially, black market from the former Soviet Union, and from countries like Pakistan and North Korea, now seems to have advantages for them, and that it's hopeless for the US to appeal to an international norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons at a time when we are insisting not only on maintaining many of thousands of nuclear weapons, but we're moving towards the development of new nuclear weapons that can threaten first use against countries that don't have them.

In short, there is no such international norm, and cannot be as long as the US and for that matter other nuclear weapons states set this kind of example. So we're moving towards a world in which many countries have nuclear weapons,.

The Bush administration is almost sure to renew the testing of nuclear weapons if it gains another term—it's preparing the laboratories for that, they've cleared the way legislatively for that by repudiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In fact, the Republican platform has favored testing now for some years, before Bush.

And that testing is very likely to lead to the testing of nuclear weapons by China, which could in turn have a domino effect of testing by Pakistan, by India and by one or both Korea, and before long by Japan. Japan could become a nuclear superpower within a year or two, not just a power but a superpower.

Moreover, the administration is openly moving towards the anti-ballistic missile system, which will probably lead to increases in the stockpile of China, which in turn will put pressure on the Koreans and on Japan to move forward.

All this in a world in which the U.S. has been hacking away at multilateral agreements that are intended to resolve conflicts—institutions that resolve conflicts, in a world in which many conflicts are going on right now, such as the India Pakistan conflict involving two nuclear powers, in which we've recently seen conflicts in Europe, as in the former Yugoslavia, and now in the Middle East.

We can look forward, in short, to a future in which there will be conflicts like former Yugoslavia—ethnic and national conflicts—in the middle east, perhaps someday in Russia, in which one or more of the parties uses nuclear weapons—an absolutely horrific prospect.

Meanwhile, the US and Russia remain armed with thousands of warheads, many of which are still on hair-trigger alert, subject to false alarms, subject to unauthorized action, and in the case of Russia, to diversion of some of the warheads into blackmarket channels.

But the possibility of a major exchange coming out of a false alarm or escalation of a conflict elsewhere in the world remains somewhat smaller than it used to be, but still far from zero, and that has the possibility of destroying the Northern hemisphere, and conceivably, most life on earth.

So there is a risk which has existed for some forty years which there was every chance and every logical motive to absolutely eliminate, and it's outrageous, inexcusable that the capability for causing nuclear winter and destroying life on earth still exists. It's inexcusable that it ever existed, but that it exists after the end of the cold war is absolutely inexcusable.

There was a dramatic chance—its pretty much been squandered—but there was a clearcut chance a dozen years ago to dismantle it—the very physical capability to cause such massive devastation, and even before that, to remove the hairtrigger alert, which has no logical justification at all, against countries that are now our virtual allies, the former Warsaw Pact countries.

So I think on the one hand we're facing a period of suddenly increasing nuclear danger, 12 years after the end of the Cold War offered the possibility of very great reduced nuclear dangers. The missing of that opportunity, and the support for openly moving towards an increased reliance on small tactical nuclear weapons, and is acting in virtually every imaginable way to encourage proliferation.

MICHAEL: Proliferation via blackmarket.

DANIEL: Any way they can. But also vertical proliferation, increases in stockpiles of existing nuclear countries, like China and Pakistan

MICHAEL: But they did one thing to discourage states from pursuing development programs, by attacking Iraq.

DANIEL: The notion of counter-proliferation did not start with Bush. It really was proclaimed as a possibility under the Clinton administration, which shows how deep-rooted these things are, has always been, essentially, a bankrupt policy, likely, on balance, to promote proliferation more than to stop it. It was explicitly modeled on Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear capability, which our very warnings of this administration have shown that attack did nothing for the nuclear program except encourage it and send it underground so it was essentially invisible, so that 10 years later in 1991, the program was much more advanced than one might have predicted. Didn't stop it at all.

Granted, the sanctions and the attack now have eliminated in the short run the chance of that particular country getting nuclear weapons, but at the cost of encouraging others to get them.

Now I will acknowledge—maybe not in the proposal, but there it is—the action of Libya is in the other direction, and could be cited. How exactly Libya came to do this is not clear yet, whether it's to be attributed more to a willingness to negotiate the issue more directly with Libya, or whether it was due—or some combination—whether it was due to their fear, the intimidation of the attack on Iraq.

If there were other examples like that, one could say there was support for the Bush theory that Iraq is the way to do this. That question is raised by the case of Libya. But I continue to feel strongly that the overall effect will be to encourage proliferation, in part because the international cooperation required to stop that—and terrorism—has been greatly hampered by our unilateralism and by our rogue behavior. That's the immediate situation.

MICHAEL: How do you see your project as contributing to reducing these dangers?

DANIEL: I think that this situation came to be—the situation we're in today, which didn't start with Bush; it's being exacerbated by Bush—reflects ignorance by the American people and the world at large of the dangers, very precisely, of American nuclear policy over the last fifty years, and the likelihood that such reckless and dangerous secret policies will be imitated by newly nuclear countries. Like India and Pakistan, and possibly even more dangerous than before, these dangers I think are greatly underestimated by a belief that the world has been, thanks to American deterrence and nuclear policy, has been relatively safe from a nuclear war for half a century, and that is a delusion. It's like the belief, before Chernoble and Three Mile Island, that nuclear production facilities were more than adequately safeguarded from destruction, and the reality was of a whole series of near-misses of core meltdowns at the plants, that were narrowly avoided, and which were covered up. Those dangers were covered up successfully over a generation, so that accidents even worse than Chernoble had been very, very definitely possible, and came close to occurring on a number of occasions. By the same token, it is false to believe, as most people do believe, that the attitudes of—and now I'll focus on the attitude of Americans, which I know most about, and which are critical here. There's a general belief that, since Hiroshima, I should say, since Nagasaki, there has really been no serious consideration of the use

of nuclear weapons in ongoing conflicts or crisis by an American official, civilian or military, and for that reason alone, the world then has been very far from the risk of nuclear war.

In fact, it's generally regarded by Americans that we have official policy—in fact, they believe generally that it's an explicit policy—that we have either an explicit or an implicit policy that we will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

Third, those who are aware that we have made threats of first use of nuclear weapons, regard those very confidently as having been bluffs, essentially.

All of these beliefs are mistaken, and I could mention some others: that the US would never strike first, an all-out stance—not only not initiate tactical nuclear weapons first, but would not launch an all-out attack first under any circumstances, but on the contrary, that we would “ride out” an attack to be sure that we were under attack by the evidence of actual explosions on our territory before we retaliated. That is mistaken.

There's an almost universal belief, even among relatively informed people, that the size and nature of the U.S. arsenal is mainly determined by the objective of retaliating to a nuclear attack, and by that capability, deterring it. That belief is mistaken.

MICHAEL: I don't see, how do these mistaken beliefs among the population contribute to the problem?

DANIEL: Yes, OK. First, they have lead to a kind of complacency, a sense of security about our nuclear policies as being thoroughly justified, and well-managed, so that they get very little attention, either in the media, or among the public. And in fact, there's a great, just great ignorance about the scale of it. If there were to know the scale, and the implications of the actual nuclear posture we've acquired, it likely would have been much harder to have the proceed with so little debate, almost a total absence of debate.

I think it's questionable—I don't want to say it's impossible, because the ability of our government to manipulate public opinion in the face of almost any reality is impressive, and you can't say that, “If they knew the truth, the government would not be able to maintain it's presence policy.” I say that with less assurance than I might have said thirty years ago. Nevertheless, they do take great effort to mislead the public, and to conceal this from them, clearly in the belief that their policies would be much less conveniently managed, with much less controversy, if the public remains ignorant. They make a considerable effort [tape end, begin Transcribed Tape 2]

It hasn't been a political issue, that we spent a vast amount, in fact, far more than the public can imagine, measured in the level of a trillion to a trillion and a half dollars, on our nuclear programs over the years, and that's gone on without public scrutiny and public debate, deliberately, by design.

But much more than that—I think it isn't just a matter of resources—the dangers of the policy I think have never been known, even to the committees in Congress that hold secret hearings on

the defense budget, do know at least where the money is going, but to my knowledge, there's never been a serious Congressional debate, even in closed hearings, on the nature of our nuclear war plans, which have been treated as secrets that have to be withheld from Congress, in fact earlier, they had been carefully withheld from civilian authority within the defense department.

MICHAEL: So you will be revealing —we're not going to say this, but off the records—you will revealing a system that many people in government feel strongly should not even be revealed strongly to Congress.

DANIEL: Now, the reason for not revealing it is almost surely that it would be highly controversial. Plausibly enough, the notion that our control system for nuclear weapons, which could be subject for attack by an enemy, has to be held extremely secret now, there's a plausible case for that. But the price has been, for that, again predictably, that in the absence of public real debate, an extremely dangerous system has been preserved for a long time, and in a certain sense, the price is far greater than the benefits of this super secrecy.

So there isn't real knowledge of the notion of how open this system has been in the past to unauthorized action, the false alarms, and the range of cases that would lead to nuclear war.

Now, let me say this. The reality here is that since before Hiroshima, there has been a very great gap between government officials, and certain elites, consultants, and establishment advisors, on the one hand, and the general public on the other, in readiness to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in warfare.

Of course, before Hiroshima, the public was not even aware that this was an issue. But if they had been, a great many people, possibly not a majority, but a very large percentage, would have been appalled by the readiness of American officials to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, which actually occurred.

There were some scientists who believed at the time, and all the more later, who believed there should have been a public examination of that subject. But what I'm saying is that, in particular since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the readiness of American officials, without saying by the way, that most of them were anxious to use nuclear weapons—some were—but the readiness to risk the possible use of nuclear weapons, and to contemplate it, prepare for it, plan for it, and threaten it—seriously threaten it, not just as a bluff—and to entertain discussion, as an option, is at very great odds with what the public understands and believes. That's a major reason for the secrecy.

I want to say, I said—in a briefing I was prepared to give to Congress years ago, which didn't come about (the hearings that I wanted didn't come about), after the Pentagon Papers—I was going to start by saying, after the Pentagon Papers, that I believe that the secrecy surrounding our decisionmaking in Vietnam, had not only lead to tens of thousands of unnecessary deaths, but was threatening our democracy. I have believed for half a century that the secrecy surrounding nuclear decisionmaking and policy and practices, above all in our own country, but also in other nuclear states as well, that that secrecy threatens the survival of our species, and even, short of that, threatens, the deaths not of thousands, but of hundreds of millions of people—the greatest conceivable stakes here—and that secrecy and deception about these matters is a direct threat.

Therefore, so let's get right to the heart of this, I believe that what's really necessary to get out of the nuclear trap this species is actually caught in, or threatened by, there has to be a revelation on the level of the Soviet Glasnost revelations about the Stalinist era, about the communist era, that lead to total change in attitude towards that system and eventually its downfall.

More concretely, there needs to be revelations on the order of the Pentagon Papers about current planning, current operations. In order to encourage people to seek that revelation by legislative investigation, governmental revelations, I propose to expose what I knew of the planning forty years ago, the planning in the late fifties and early sixties. In 2008 that would be fifty years. It's like forty-five years, many aspects of which are known to exist today, but which have never been reported concretely by an insider on the scale that could attract attention to this problem.

The motives that bore on the building of what amounted to a doomsday machine, a system for ending the lives of hundreds of millions of people, possibly all life on earth, more or less automatically, in the event of one of a range of possible trigger events, and almost nobody has appreciated either the scale of destruction that was prepared and planned contingently, or the degree of automaticity that was built in, or—and this is almost the most staggering—the range of circumstances under which the American officials were willing to contemplate deliberately launching this machine.

The notion that the machine was built only for deterrence, and was contemplated for use almost exclusively in the event of a soviet nuclear attack, or an imminent nuclear attack, has always been false. There was always a much greater range in which that was not the most likely event that would lead to this destruction, and that's been a secret basically to most Americans, even within the government to a large extent.

I have been an anti-nuclear activist, essentially, since the ending of the Vietnam war, almost thirty years ago, and I have great respect for the people who contributed to that both with their activism and with their information and analysis—political activity. I have felt that nearly—with very few exceptions—nearly every person in that worldwide movement that I know actually underestimated the nature and degree—the urgency—of the dangers of nuclear war, nuclear explosions, that their inevitable—given the secrecy system—their lack of awareness of the nature of our planning and of the inside threats that were made, made them underestimate the likelihood that nuclear explosions would actually occur in current situations.

I also felt their analysis of the nature of the problem was mistaken to a large extent, in that they were not addressing the motivations inside government for the kinds of nuclear development that was going on, so that their public arguments were not suited to address those concerns, or to change people's minds on the inside, or to meet the issues, which were leading to the nuclear program.

In fact, the public political discussion on this, while it could draw on quite appropriate public emotions about the horror of nuclear war, were not even addressing the actual arguments that were being made internally for the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, so it was

easy for insiders, and the people who respected those insiders, to dismiss these complaints as sentimental, uninformed, and not related to the realities that they were supposedly addressing.

I propose in this book to lay out some of the internal logic, to give a kind of internal coherence to our programs, so that there can at last be a public discussion of some of these issues that addresses the logical arguments that have been made for our actual policies.

So that's what I hope to do. What do I hope to achieve? To the extent that what I'm revealing is taken at least provisionally to be realistic, to be true, and to the extent that gets attention, I would hope for public horror—shock and awe—at what has been constructed in their name, but short of that, and I wouldn't expect everybody to accept it just because I said it, I would hope to start the kind of investigation of these questions, in Congress, and in other countries, that has really never gotten started, and a demand for more information about current plans and current posture, and discussion.

For example, various senators, especially Senator Robert Kerry, for years in the senate, while he was still there, asked for and demanded to be briefed on the actual war plans and the targeting, and was refused on every occasion. He never did get to see them. Basically, this is an outrageous situation, which is the negation of democracy, and we have not had anything like democracy in public control of our nuclear weapons policy, any more than of our covert operations policy. I think the cost in this case has been the pursuit of a grotesquely dangerous, reckless, and wrongful policy.

If any policy ever, including the Holocaust, deserved to be described as an immoral policy, this one is, although the fact is that in the absence of public debate and challenge, perfectly morally and conscientious men, by general standards, have found themselves able, have been blinded to the moral implications of what they're doing, and have not reflected on those in any deep way, and have gone along with it.

MICHAEL: Now, we're going to funders to propose this project, and I assume that in the proposal you're going to say that essentially what you're doing here is whistleblowing, blowing the whistle on a secret policy. Now, there are people in power, the people who keep these secrets claim the reason they keep these secrets is in the interest of our most urgent national and sensitive national security, and you're going against what they're saying. Is there anything we can tell our funders to assure them that you're not endangering national security, as these people are going to claim.

DANIEL: That raises the question of how open we want to make it—especially in writing that could be passed around—the notion that we'll be revealing secrets. That's a very delicate question. That's in a way the reason I want to go to funders, and maybe we could discuss this with Chet, not over the phone. A reason for going the funding route rather than publishing is to downplay the element of whistleblowing.

OK, let's ask for a moment, what will I really be revealing? Well, truthfully, very little of what I'll be talking about has ever been declassified. Exceptions there are that I think an important

part of this, having to do with the first-use threats that we've made has bit-by-bit come out, and after all, I learned it on an unclassified basis, most of that.

In terms of the earlier period, a number of the reports that were shaping my thinking, from RAND, those have been declassified. The RAND work on the whole has been declassified.

Plans up to the one I drafted, the guidelines, have been declassified pretty much, right up to 1960. Interestingly—and that was 20 years ago—in the last 20 years, as far as I can tell, there was a block there. They haven't brought themselves to declassify any of the plans from '61, that I'm aware of. You might think year by year they'd go year by year, but it hasn't happened that way.

There's no question though—of course, a lot of stuff from the Quemoy crisis has been classified, but I suspect that is hottest has not. For instance, I came across a note by Tom Reifer after looking at the Quemoy stuff. See, I think you were impressed by the fact that there's still a lot of nuclear stuff in the declassified part, so they didn't take out all the nuclear. But I noticed he looked at patterns, and he found quite significant differences between the stuff that is classified and the stuff that isn't, so we want to put that out, because it is more shocking.

The Cuban Missile Crisis stuff was—there was an aspect of that that I would have put out that was highly classified, but it's out now anyways. The Cuban Missile Crisis I can talk about without actually revealing.

The question is, simply, can you make the book sound good enough without pressing that you're going to be revealing secrets. I think if you press secrets, the funders won't feel free—I think both the funders and the publishers—the publishers might more likely take a chance, but they might also leak—I think the funders, with their worries about their taxes, would not want to be told that they're putting out secrets.

It's not the secrets that are the essence of the book. The truth is, most of the secrets that I'll be putting out, are things I have said repeatedly over the years. Even the whole Quemoy thing I gave to the Japanese, had it translated into Japanese, the whole study, so the chance of prosecution at this point is very negligible, really.

MICHAEL: Then that will be your answer. Everything I'll be saying I've already said repeatedly in public, now were just putting it together comprehensively for a general public, instead of narrow audiences.

DANIEL: Why will this get any attention? Because no one has written from within the system on these matters, as a memoir. It does not exist, in the literature, the revelation of personal, authoritative description, because the people who have been on the inside have been, without exception, very jealous of their clearances, their access, their possibility of being consultants after they've left service, and I would say their ability to be channeled from the grave, as far as I can tell; their reputation for discretion they want to outlive them enormously. They want on their tombstones, the epitaph, "*He never* told the truth to any unauthorized person."

So, this is a unique memoir, a unique revelation, of the realities, each part of which, actually, is known by now to hundreds to thousands of insiders, none of whom tell it to an outsider, and really the number who know it comprehensively as I do, for a given period, is quite small. People who know several sides to it, like the first-use threats, as well as the actual plan, something I studied inside the system to a very unusual degree. Very few people studied the plans like I did with the access I had, and almost no one at that time knew the plans like I did.

I'll tell you something. . . [TT2B] How could the last generation of analysts and officials have pursued these policies, how could they not see they were dealing with an insane policy here? Building up tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.

It occurred to me, for most of them, the ones who got into it after '65, say forty years ago, have lived in a world in which it was true that another superpower had thousands to tens of thousands of weapons pointed at them. That seemed to eliminate, somehow, the moral issue of our doing it—we were just doing what an enemy was doing to us, and we were living in a world in which someone else was building the capability to annihilate the world, and it seemed to undermine any worry of our doing it.

The perspective that I came from was of a world which hasn't really existed since '65, that I knew in '61 and '62, and most people didn't know, that the world—and this was right, this wasn't one of those illusions—that we weren't threatened by a country that had an ability to destroy us. They hadn't sought it, at that point, they hadn't developed it, they hadn't bought it, they didn't have it.

So, I've seen our build-up, which mainly took place after that, I've been aware that that was a choice we made at a time that we were not threatened by an enemy who was doing the same at that point. Almost none of these people are really clearly aware of that. What they know of the history really doesn't make clear to them just how naked the Soviet Union was in terms of intercontinental capability in the early '60's.

They may have, from their reading, they may know the history that we believed that we were facing an enemy that, just as we could have expected Hitler to do, was bent, at almost any cost, of acquiring a capability of annihilating us. Footnote. Even Hitler, in fact, that was an illusion for Hitler. He hadn't been doing it either. He didn't have a Manhattan Project. Certainly not because he would have thought it was immoral. That was not the problem. He just didn't think it was feasible. We had every confidence that Hitler would have done it if he thought it was feasible, which was probably true. Maybe the Soviets would have done it, if they thought it was feasible, maybe yes or no.

But we lived in the fifties with the belief that we were racing a country that was hell-bent on acquiring the physical capability of wiping us off the face of the planet. So, facing that, that seemed to answer, or just preclude, a lot of moral concern, or even practical concern, about whether what we were doing was prudent. We were in a desperate race to deter this, and you could still have asked, is this the best way to deal with this.

Another aspect, we thought, was, we were facing an enemy that could not be stopped by negotiation. Here again we equated with Hitler, almost surely wrongly. In retrospect, we could have negotiated, they were not like Hitler in that respect. We could have negotiated limits with respect to missiles. Whether we could have gotten abolition is another question, but could we have negotiated non-missile testing, which is easy to observe, or could we have negotiated a quite reliable nuclear warhead ban? Yes. But that wasn't even considered, on the grounds that it really was unattainable.

Why? Because of the demonic nature of our enemy, that they would break any agreement, and that they were determined not just to get the missile, but to have an annihilating capability, and very much within this Cold War assumption that they had a practical, concrete, and immediate objective or ruling the world, and by the way, ruling it the way they ruled Russia, that is total control, totalitarian government. We had an objective of ruling the world, in a much more benign, indirect way, economically and covertly. But no, they wanted to do it with armies and secret police.

So, that defined our enemy, supposedly, so the point was that we just didn't get the moral discussion.

OK, there was a brief window that I think is really important to bring out in this book, that almost nobody has this in their consciousness, that having most of the insiders believing this, and right wingers and Cold Warriors outside, believing this for a decade, or two decades, from 45 on, there came to be a period, of 61, 62, 63, where it was clear that our assumptions had all been wrong, that if anybody raised the question, "Could we negotiate an agreement with the Soviets on avoiding an arms race?" it seems to answer itself. They weren't racing us anyway, even without an agreement, so if they could get an agreement that could hold us down, at the cost of staying where they were, they almost surely could have. They weren't showing any strong determination to build up at all.

So the world could have gone in a terribly different direction. I've become aware that, for reasons that aren't entirely clear—intertial, bureaucratic, whatever the reasons, we were in effect choosing to pursue a particular path, but we weren't held by logic—we were not exploring alternatives, we were not exploring other ways to really reduce this danger, other than being, and continuing to be, by far the strongest kid on the block, being number one as our single path that we were interested in exploring.

Obviously, a major aspect of that—and now looking back over the years, even long before the Second World War, you can see that a path which lead to great government subsidies to leading industries, like steel earlier, for battleships, but in particular the aerospace industry, that a path that involved huge government subsidies for aerospace had very great advantages politically and bureaucratically over any path that would lead to less spending on these things—in fact, it was very hard to beat. And that logic and rationality and premises and intelligence estimates tended to fall in line to support heavy government spending on aerospace, and that this in turn as related to a more general interest of our multinational corporations in worldwide markets, a general indirect empire. These are two separate interests converging, the subsidies and the empire.

I'll mention a couple of things here. One point. Things that I will bring out that are not part of general awareness, I mentioned already the doomsday aspects of this, the possible events that could trigger it, the question of delegation and the risks of false alarm. There's new documentation of this for the first time in the last couple of years, which has not gotten into the general press.

Second, that the US has used nuclear weapons, a couple of dozen times, in the way that you use a gun when you point it at someone's head. We have used our weapons, in the sense of threatening them for imminent use, with varying effects, going all the way back, to possibly the first use since Nagasaki was, according to President Truman, was in Iran, in 1946. To leap ahead, by the way, there is increasing data on a major nuclear crisis over Iran, in 1980, during the election, Carter's second election, which he lost.

People there regarded—in fact, I want to talk to a couple, including Powell. I want to talk to Jimmy Carter directly, about the details of what Powell called “the most serious nuclear crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis.” As I say, that was in 1980, since then, a use of our nuclear weapons, by threat, directly, in 1991, and now. In fact, I have a suspicion that one could investigate, that George W. Bush reversed the policy of his father of taking all weapons off naval vessels, which was an extremely good move at that time, it warms my heart still when I think about it. I suspect in this war we put nuclear weapons on some carriers, again to get ready to use in Iraq. That would be awfully big to try to pin down, and I think the logic would be very strong there. All you'd have to do is reverse a secret order. No one's really asking about that.

The British government revealed for the first time, officially, last week, that the British government had nuclear weapons on British ships in the Falklands in 1982, 81 or 82. That was 25 years ago, and literally last week, they just admitted that they had that, and I'll bet they have them off Iraq right now.

There's this hidden nuclear crisis of 1980, the current uses. The truth is, my thesis, about the fact that we've used the weapons, is little known. That came out of the Vietnam War. What put me onto that was the revelation by Roger Morris in 1974, just after Nixon had resigned, he revealed that Nixon had made nuclear threats in 1969. The documentation on that has just come out, about six months ago, so again, it takes thirty years for this stuff to come out. The question that posed for me was, Jesus Christ, I don't know anyone who knows more about our nuclear planning than I do, and if I didn't know this—which I didn't—what more is there that I've missed, that I didn't know, and it was then, in '74, that I really began to look seriously at past threats of nuclear weapons. So I made one of the first lists up to that time of uses of nuclear weapons, so that would be a major thing to put into the book.

Specifically, that Cuban Missile Crisis is misunderstood. Even McNamara, who says we missed it just by luck, we missed nuclear war, it was a matter of luck. I know 100%, he does not know that we came even closer than he knows, and just how that happened, and what the luck was, so I can bring out many aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis—I have this huge library of information that has never been known.

And then other examples. I'd like to put out, actually, in detail, I'd like to gather together all the known now official statements of use of nuclear weapons from the inside, which will just blow people away when they read page after page after page after page of discussions, almost none of which are known. It's like Quemoy. It comes up all the time, in one incident, but when you have discussion of all these difference incidents together, it's very powerful, and I've collected all of those.

The deployment issue. There's new documents, some of which we can get out. The National Security Archives has documents you can only find on their website, that we could put in.